Author: Tofig Shahniyarov, MPA at ADA University, 2020-2022, Doctor of Philosophy – PhD at Middlesex University
Editor: Elnur Karimov, LLD (Doctoral Program in Law) at Kyushu University, 2021-2024
Abstract
The term ‘hybrid warfare’ has been a controversial topic of scholarly debate since it first emerged on the international scene nearly two decades ago. The term thereby lacks conceptual clarity, stemming its origin from the concept of ‘war’ threshold in various jurisdictions. This article argues that ‘hybrid warfare’ is much more than many think in covering all the methods or means of the war, but it should not be perceived by international law as a ‘grand strategy’. The paper provides a brief overview of the recent so-called “44-day war” between Armenia and Azerbaijan as it proves ‘hybrid warfare’ to be real through conventional and non-conventional means of conducting war. The article concludes that ‘hybrid warfare’ may arise even below the threshold of ‘war’ containing online disinformation campaigns and lawfare in the international courts.
Introduction
The concept of “hybrid warfare” has gained importance over the last years, as we have witnessed an increased number of armed hostilities in Europe and beyond. However, the controversy around the meaning of this concept is more appealing than ever among the Western authorities, mainly for two reasons: firstly, the initial notion of the concept of ‘hybrid warfare’ lacked some new elements when it first appeared in the scholarly debate, secondly, the concept was adopted in accordance with the subject matter of each case (Bilal, 2021). As each new case emerges over time, the need to clarify the term ‘hybrid warfare’ to make it useful has been a challenging task not only for scholars but also for analysts and practitioners.
This paper aims to explore the term ‘hybrid warfare’ by looking at the exemplary case of the second Karabakh war and the lawfare arising out of this war between Armenia and Azerbaijan that occurred in 2020. To this end, it will clarify the concept of the term ‘hybrid warfare’ and proceed with the specific war in which this term can be elaborated.
The concept of ‘hybrid warfare’ and its critique
Before clarifying the concept of ‘hybrid warfare’, it is important to consider historical developments relating to this term. The term first appeared in the article “The Rise of Hybrid Wars” written by US military officials in 2005. The article defines it as “the combination of conventional and unconventional strategies, methods, and tactics … as well as the psychological or information-related aspects of modern conflicts” (“Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars | Proceedings”, 2019). It was then reformulated upon Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 following several events such as the Russian support for the Antimaydan movements, and Russia’s military “intelligence apparatus” existing in Ukraine (Bilal, 2021). The scope of the term thus enlarged with the extension from covering merely unconventional methods of conducting war to “economic, psychological, and cyber warfare” to espionage activities by the enemy (Costea, 2022). The attacks and threats of this sort of warfare are referred to as ‘hybrid’ which initially contained only a kinetic and lethal component in itself.
For this reason, so far, there has been no consensus among scholars about what ‘hybrid warfare’ exactly amounts to. The concept ‘of hybrid warfare’ which is referred to as “a catch-all phrase or a buzzword with limited analytical value” by several authors is not anything distinctly new (Bilal, 2021; Reichborn-Kjennerud & Cull, 2016). As one analyst said, “the hybrid construct was deduced from looking at the enemy” (Hoffman, 2009), shifting the definition of war itself in accordance with the “subject of analysis” in each war case (Reichborn-Kjennerud & Cull, 2016). The meaning of ‘hybrid warfare’ therefore has moved from conventional war methods which involve “lethal or kinetic force” to new methods such as “psychological or information-related aspects” (Bilal, 2021).
From the viewpoint of NATO officials, however, the term ‘hybrid warfare’ is used “as a tool for strategic communication rather than a military concept” (Caliskan, 2020). The practitioners and analysts have gone too far to argue that the term helps NATO “to forget the difference between war and peace” (ibid.). It appears as the most accepted definition amongst others as ‘hybrid’ reflects not only warfare of enemy states but that conducted by non-state actors such as terrorist organizations and transnational companies.
The problem in the Western approach largely derives from the conceptualisation of “war” itself – what it is and how the war threshold should be interpreted. It lies very much in its political nature and instrumental character within the perspective of Western understanding of the term “war”. The lack of clarity in the concept of ‘hybrid warfare’ depends on the understanding of the war in different spheres, its characteristics, and most importantly, its meaning for the “distinctions between peace, conflict, and war” (Reichborn-Kjennerud & Cull, 2016). The confusion thus arises over the wording of ‘hybrid’ mainly because the borders of the line between war and peace are not much clear in the western understanding.
Apart from that, “war” is also perceived as “an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will” by some authorities, which necessitates clarifying the meaning of “force” further (ibid.). It should be noted that “hybrid warfare” is much more than using force (in other words, “warfighting”) but less than ‘grand strategy’ which was described as a theory of the state “about how it can best ‘cause’ security for itself” (Posen, 2014). The term ‘grand strategy’ seems to draw attention to several questions on “why, how and for what purposes state employ their national power, including the crucible of military force” (Lissner, 2022). Hence, the term ‘grand strategy’ refers to all means, and tools used before, during, or after the war.
Although the concept of ‘hybrid warfare’ met with harsh criticism due to a lack of conceptual clarity when it was first introduced, it now leaves room for a novel way of thinking to address future defence and security challenges. The term mainly deals with how the subject of warfare whether it be a state or non-state actor uses its power to defeat the enemy (Reichborn-Kjennerud & Cull, 2016). To put it simply, the term ‘hybrid warfare’ entails traditional and non-traditional ways of conducting war, including but not limited to the “special forces, local armed actors, economic clout, disinformation, and exploitation of socio-political polarisation” (Bilal, 2021).
Overview: “44-day” war
Early in the 1990s, the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan that culminated in the forced emigration of almost 750,000 Azerbaijanis led to Armenia’s military triumph and occupation of Upper Karabakh and seven surrounding districts (the “Occupied Territories”). The United Nations (UN) assessed that the occupation by Armenia had caused Azerbaijan a total economic loss of $53.5 billion (“Human Development Report 2000”, 2000, p. 52).
Some argue that the Nagorno Karabakh conflict between the two countries – Armenia and Azerbaijan – in the South Caucasus is one of the examples in which extended use of modern military arsenals such as drones and heavy weapons and a mix of “hybrid warfare” primarily interacted with each other (Mustafayev, 2022; Shaffer, 2022). The “44-day” war involved worldwide attention to the matter, and things turned out to be globally attractive in terms of contemporary methods of ‘war’ threshold.
Following the so-called “44-day war” over the Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding districts which are internationally recognized territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan (UN Security Council Resolutions 822, 853, 874, 884), Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a Russia-brokered ceasefire agreement. The war ended with Azerbaijan’s victory, using modern warfare tools both through conventional and non-conventional means between these countries. Hence, many argued that ‘hybrid warfare’ is a real concept involving not only heavy military pieces of equipment but also cyber-attacks, seeking out “lawfare” before the international courts, information propaganda, and so on, due to this war (ibid.).
Information wars
The “44-day war” was also widely covered on social media, providing a large amount of publicly sourced information in the form of a large number of videos, photographs, satellite images, and analyses. The information circulated on social media highlights not only the ongoing military operations but also the composition of the Armenian occupation forces, their locations, military bases, command and control structures, weapons used and attacks, which are necessary to assess its ability to effectively control the occupied territories (Mustafayev, 2022).
Additionally, the so-called “44-day war” entailed several elements of ‘hybrid warfare’ other than what was discussed above. This includes, but is not limited to the deliberate missile attacks by Armenia on the civil population living in Azerbaijani cities, such as Barda and Ganja; on energy pipelines and export infrastructure of Azerbaijan (Shaffer, 2022, p. 37). This kind of event that happened during the war confronted extensive disinformation campaigns by the media in both countries. The parties also threatened each other by exploiting the energy plants existing in another country; Armenia threatened to attack the Mingachevir hydropower station, and, in turn, Baku threatened by attacking Armenia’s Metsamor nuclear power plant.
The increasing use of new digital tools, such as open-source intelligence offers a new avenue for gathering and presenting evidence establishing the occupation military in the new digital era. Since this war has been a significant reference point for many to clarify the concept of ‘hybrid warfare’, the term again gained the attention of the international community later after the occupation of Crimea. Due to the popularity and well-suitability of this war to the definition of ‘hybrid warfare’, its formulation in this regard will be analyzed below.
“Lawfare” within hybrid warfare?
Today, states use all available means at their disposal to win over enemies that could be otherwise to the detriment of the acting state. In this regard, the three-decades conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia is not an exception as it not only involved military clashes or violations of the ceasefire agreement signed in 1994 but also further led to mutual information war as well as lawfare using the international courts.
Before delving into the features of the “44-day war”, we need to assess the hybrid character of the occupation of Azerbaijani territories by Armenia. One of the notable cases concerning “hybrid military occupation” has been the case of Chiragov and Others v. Armenia before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The case concerns the displacement and violation of human rights of six Azerbaijani-Kurdish families and other subsequent cases. The ECtHR uses the effective control test to determine whether a member state – Armenia – has positive or negative obligations to ensure human rights undertakings and if it exercises authority outside of its territory (such as through military occupation). In this regard, the ECtHR’s rulings regarding the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan have largely remained consistent. For instance, the ECtHR established Armenia’s extraterritorial jurisdiction in the Occupied Territories by virtue of its effective control in this case concerning the protection of the rights of the applicants. Effective control was demonstrated by the “high integration” of Armenia’s military, economy, political, and legal realms as well as a local government and “military support.” (Chiragov and Others v. Armenia, [GC] no. 13216/05, §§ 167-201, ECHR 2015). Mustafayev argues that this so-called “Chiragov test” proved to assess “an act of hybrid military occupation” with the establishment of new legal criteria in international law (Mustafayev, 2022).
Another example of lawfare within the context of ”hybrid warfare” is the requested interim measures under Rule 39 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) from the conflict parties on September 27 and October 27, 2020. These interstate applications contain widespread infringement violations by the respondent States during the “44-day war”. On January 15 and February 1 2022, the Court received the complete applications in the inter-State cases Azerbaijan v. Armenia (no. 47319/20) and Armenia v. Azerbaijan (no.42521/20). The alleged acts of violations include indiscriminate attacks on civilians and public property and infrastructure, execution, ill-treatment and mutilation of warriors, consequences of the detention of prisoners of war, and forced relocation of civilians in the areas affected by the war. Azerbaijan further submits that Armenia is responsible for the alleged ECHR violations occurring in Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding territories since 1992, including the prosecution and displacement of hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis from their homes and belongings; the ill-treatment and disappearance of Azerbaijani citizens without proper investigation; and the destruction of cultural and religious property.
Furthermore, the ICJ – the principal judicial organ of the UN – received a request for the indication of provisional measures from both countries concerning the violations of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination during the year 2021. The ICJ granted five provisional measures; four against Azerbaijan, one against Armenia, and one against both states (Green, 2021).
All of these cases at the disposal of international courts show that the 2020 war has not just comprised traditional tools of ”warfighting”; it also covered much beyond the scope of what has been perceived as ‘hybrid warfare’ by the international community.
Conclusion
While the term ”hybrid warfare” has lacked conceptual clarity over the last two decades, it is commonly understood under international law that the notion captured not only means of warfighting but also a great magnitude of activities. This article provided a clear scope of the concept by looking at the specific war situation between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The ”44-day” war proved to have several features of ‘hybrid warfare’ in itself and proved the concept to be real and as a mixture of traditional and non-traditional tools of conducting war. The article mainly focused on the lawfare – interstate applications before the ECHR and ICJ – within the context of ”hybrid warfare” throughout this war. All in all, the scope of the term ”hybrid warfare” is much larger than one perceives, but it is not as much as a ‘grand strategy’, given its certain aspects such as spreading information, making cyber-attacks, and making lawfare.
Literature
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